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Abstract 
 
  
This thesis explores to what degree the Wehrmacht was involved in atrocities on the Eastern Front and 
the structures that led to this involvement.  The goal is to show that the men of the Wehrmacht were 
incorporated more completely into a genocidal ‘war of annihilation’ than has been previously thought. 
It will be demonstrated that the Wehrmacht Heer on the Ostfront cannot be understood as a traditional 
army conducting a conventional war. However, it was not made up of rabidly anti-Semitic ‘willing 
executioners’ either. This research is based mainly on perpetrator testimony, including secret POW 
recordings, official Wehrmacht documents and soldiers testimonies.  Upon examination of these 
documents, it becomes clear that Wehrmacht Heer units during the Ostkreig were instructed and prepared 
not only to assist the SS and Einsatzgruppen in prosecuting the Final Solution, but also to act 
independently as a kind of ‘vanguard’ of annihilation in their area of operations. In contrast to existing 
interpretations however, this thesis will argue that in general soldiers did not commit war crimes due to 
Nazi indoctrination/ingrained anti-Semitism or through peer pressure and brutalisation but because of 
indiscriminate rules of engagement set within an extremely rigid military structure, which explicitly 
equated Jews with Bolshevik partisans while considering Soviet POWs and civilians to be expendable.  
 
 
 
          
 
 
          211 words. 
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List of  Abbreviations and Foreign Terms 
 
  
Aktionen – action, in this context referring to Wehrmacht/Einsatzgruppen operations 
 
Barbarossa – codename for German invasion of the Soviet Union, begun 22 June 1941       
 
Commissar – political officer attached to Red Army units at command level 
 
Einsatzgruppen – police battalions attached to SS units, organized as killing squads  
 
Gestapo – Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police) 
 
Heer - Army 
 
NSFO - Nationalsozialistische Führungsoffiziere, Nazi political commissars 
 
OKW – Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High Command) 
 
Ostfront – Eastern Front 
 
Ostheer – Eastern Army  
 
Ostkrieg – Eastern War 
 
SD – Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service), Nazi intelligence agency 
 
Soldaten/Landser – soldier 
 
Sonderweg – ‘special path’, specifically the ‘uniqueness’ of the path of German history  
 
SS – Schutzstaffel, the paramilitary arm of the Nazi party, separate from the Wehrmacht  
 
Vernichtungskriegthese – war of annihilation thesis 
 
Volksgemeinschaft – national/peoples community (or racial community) 
 
Waffen-SS – combat SS troops, with a separate command structure to Wehrmacht troops 
 
Wehrmacht – German armed forces 
 
Weltanschauungen – worldviews, ideologies 
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Introduction  
 
  
Over the last forty years, perceptions of the Wehrmacht’s involvement in the Holocaust, 
particularly on the Eastern Front, have changed dramatically.1 Although early historical 
interpretations portrayed the Schutzstaffel (SS) and Einsatzgruppen as fanatically loyal, 
indoctrinated killers who carried out the genocidal National Socialist agenda, the 
Wehrmacht has typically been seen as a traditional army - understood to have conducted 
an ‘honorable’ war.2 More recently, however, the Wehrmacht has been implicated as a 
more active player in various crimes against humanity on the Eastern Front, and this 
traditional view has become untenable.3 Newly declassified archives and fresh 
perspectives on extant sources reveal disturbing facts about soldiers’ attitudes, official 
Wehrmacht doctrine and the extent of the Wehrmacht’s atrocities in the Ostkrieg. 
 
This thesis will explore to what extent German soldiers of the Ostheer conformed 
to National Socialism ideology and engaged in atrocities in line with Nazi racial policy by 
investigating perpetrator testimony in several chapters. First, it will consider how 
previous scholars dealt with or failed to deal with the Wehrmacht’s involvement in the 
Holocaust, and the source issues relating to the topic. Secondly, soldiers’ perspectives on 
Nazism, racial policy and Jews will be explored using secretly recorded and recently 
declassified POW transcripts. Using POW transcripts alone, however, does not give 
enough background on the Wehrmacht’s war on the Ostfront. Official Wehrmacht doctrine 
                                                 
1 Although the Wehrmacht encompassed all branches of the military, this thesis will focus on the 
Wehrmacht Heer - the German Army. The terms Wehrmacht, Army, Heer and Ostheer are all used in 
this thesis to refer to the Wehrmacht Heer on the Eastern Front.  
2 Especially the officer corps, tied strongly to the noble military traditions of East Prussia. 
3 In particular, Omer Bartov, Hannes Heer and Rolf-Dieter Müller have led revisionist scholarship; see 
O. Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), The Eastern Front, 1941-45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) and H. Heer, ‘Killing Fields: The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in 
Belorussia, 1941-1942.’ Holocaust Genocide Studies, Vol.11, Iss.1 (1997): 79-101; R. Müller, Die 
Wehrmacht - Historische Last und Verantwortung: Die Historiographie im Spannungsfeld von 
Wissenschaft und Vergangenheitsbewältigung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999). 
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must be scrutinized through several key orders and documents drafted and distributed to 
troops before and during Operation Barbarossa, to show that the Wehrmacht was 
prepared by the Nazi state as a key tool in a genocidal ‘war of extermination’ on the 
Ostfront. Finally, incidents of Wehrmacht involvement in crimes against humanity on the 
ground in the Soviet Union will be evaluated using post-war soldier testimony, war 
diaries, memoirs and letters home to assess whether the Wehrmacht was more explicitly 
genocidal in nature than historians and the public have generally believed, and to analyse 
the nature of these crimes and their relationship to the Holocaust at large. 
 
It will be argued through analysing recorded POW transcripts that attempts to 
Nazify German soldiers and the Wehrmacht itself were not entirely successful. However, 
despite sometimes ambivalent attitudes to the regime, it appears units of the Ostheer 
committed atrocities on a regular basis. It is clear that blind faith in Nazism and the 
Führer and rabid anti-Semitism were not to blame for the bulk of Wehrmacht atrocities, 
but a lack of ideological commitment does not appear to have prevented war crimes 
either. In fact it will be argued that rather than individual or squad ideology the structures 
put in place governing (and enabling) soldiers’ behaviour during the Ostkreig played much 
more of a role - in particular indiscriminate and unique rules of engagement regarding 
partisans, Soviet POWs and Jews. Directives from above such as the ‘Commissar Order’ 
and the Jewish-Partisan construct framed the conflict in ideological and racial terms as a 
‘war of annihilation’. These rules of engagement for the Ostfront officially released soldiers 
and officers from the rules of war laid out in the Geneva Convention, completely altering 
the tone of the conflict and allowing Wehrmacht units to act independently to prosecute 
the Holocaust in the East. Although can be shown that Wehrmacht soldiers were not 
always ‘willing executioners’, they were executioners of convenience nonetheless. 
 7 
Historiography and Source Limitations 
 
  
Intentionalists versus Structuralists 
Before delving deeper into the historiography, it is necessary to frame the debate around 
the Holocaust in broader terms. Most of the scholarship on the Holocaust in the last 
thirty years has fallen into either the intentionalist or structuralist/functionalist schools of 
interpretation. Intentionalist historians such as Andreas Hillgruber and Karl Bracher 
placed emphasis on the central role of Hitler and Nazi ideology in leading Germany 
towards the Holocaust. 4 Some intentionalist arguments support a kind of Sonderweg 
interpretation, in which Nazi aggression and anti-Semitism were somehow unique to a 
German ‘national character’.5 Structuralist historians included Hans Mommsen and 
Martin Broszat, who argued that Hitler’s will and National Socialist ideology was diffused 
and diluted through the myriad structures of the Nazi state and military, and these 
structures are mostly to blame for the Holocaust, rather than Hitler or Nazi ideals.6 In 
this way, the structuralists argue for a kind of genocide through bureaucracy, in which 
the Holocaust was not ordained from the start, but rather was brought about by a 
complex series of structures and events.  
 
The intentionalist school has been strongly criticised as being too simplistic and 
broad in its interpretations, particularly in placing far much emphasis on the role of 
Hitler.7 Conversely, the structuralist school, opposing historians argue, does not appoint 
                                                 
4 See K. Bracher, ‘The Role of Hitler: Perspectives of Interpretation,’ Fascism: A Reader’s Guide, ed. 
by Walter Laqueur (London: Harmonsworth Publishing, 1979); A. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two 
World Wars (London: Harvard University Press, 1981). 
5 S. Kattago, Ambiguous Memory: The Nazi Past and German National Identity (Westport: Praeger, 
2001), pp. 59-60. 
6 See M. Broszat, “Hitler and the Genesis of the ‘Final Solution’: An Assessment of David Irving’s 
Theses,” in Aspects of the Third Reich, ed. by H. W. Koch (London: Macmillan, 1985), 390-429; H. 
Mommsen, From Weimar to Auschwitz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); M. Burleigh and 
W. Wippermann The Racial State, Germany 1933-1945, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), pp. 96-97.  
7 Burleigh and Wippermann, The Racial State, pp. 95-97. 
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enough blame for the Holocaust.8 Instead blame is diffused through the structure of 
Nazi bureaucracy, and so this interpretation often overlooks the motivations of the 
perpetrators and the suffering of victims.9 It is important to note this historiographical 
dichotomy as it has informed much of the debate surrounding the Holocaust and 
Nazism, and the historians mentioned in this paper either fit in some way into this 
continuum, or have been influenced by it.  This thesis leans somewhat more towards a 
structuralist approach, by arguing that structures put in place on the Ostheer were 
ultimately more crucial to soldiers’ actions than personal ideological convictions (and 
therefore Nazi indoctrination or ingrained anti-Semitism). 
 
Early Interpretations 
The Gestapo, Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and SS were all condemned as criminal organizations 
at the Nuremburg Trials, but the Wehrmacht was not, thanks in part to impassioned 
testimonies from German generals and the lack of solid documentary evidence that they 
were involved in war crimes at the time.10 The SS in particular became - in Gerald 
Reitlinger’s words - the convenient ‘alibi of a nation’, taking the blame for the bulk of 
German war crimes.11 This meant that Wehrmacht troops were largely viewed as simple 
soldiers fighting in a traditional army, which happened to be directed by the Nazi state. 
 
For many years the orthodox historical view held that the Wehrmacht’s war was 
waged rather like that of the Allies: in accordance with the Geneva and Hague 
conventions. This was partly because much of the history was written by military 
historians, who were interested mainly in the tactics and strategy of the Wehrmacht. Omer 
                                                 
8 Bartov, Germany's War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2003), p. 81. 
9 Ibid., pp. 79-81, Burleigh and Wippermann, The Racial State, p. 96.  
10 The head of the OKW, Keitel, was sentenced to death for war crimes, but he was an exception. See 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judkeite.asp . 
11 D. Stone, The Historiography of the Holocaust (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 199. 
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Bartov recounts the example of British military historian Basil Liddell Hart, who was 
convinced of the ‘gentlemanliness’ of the Wehrmacht’s war by Generalfeldmarschall von 
Blomberg, causing Hart to remark that ‘The German Army in the field [in the Second 
World War] on the whole observed the rules of war better than it did in 1914-18.’12 Much 
of the scholarship in the post-war period followed Hart’s line of thinking, with the 
Wehrmacht being viewed as a traditional army. 
 
‘Ordinary Men’? Browning versus Goldhagen 
Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men, while not investigating the Wehrmacht, is a very 
important part of the scholarship on troop motivation. Ordinary Men analyses the 
Hamburg Reserve Police Battalion 101 operating as part of the Einsatzgruppen, a 
paramilitary unit whose purpose was to ‘mop up’ pockets of Jews and racial and political 
undesirables on the Eastern Front.13 Browning proposes that mob-mentality and peer 
pressure within the unit created an environment in which atrocities became normalised 
and routine.14 In this interpretation ordinary, family men became killers not due to hatred 
or fanaticism, but through a kind of situational ‘group-think’ and eventual brutalisation. 
In Browning’s words, this ‘brutalization was not the cause but the effect of these men’s 
behaviour’.15 While the general experience of Browning’s subjects differs somewhat from 
that of the Ostheer soldiers, as they take place in Poland and within the Einsatzgruppen, his 
findings show that indoctrination and belief in National Socialism were not required for 
‘ordinary men’ to commit atrocities on a massive scale. 
 
Daniel Goldhagen went even further in his controversial work Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, analysing in part the same Police Battalion 
                                                 
12 Von Blomberg was the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht pre-war, though he later fell out of 
favour. Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. 2.  
13 C. Browning, Ordinary Men, (Harper Collins, 1993), p. 3-8.  
14 Ibid., p. 180-189. 
15 Ibid., p. 161. 
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that Browning explored. Goldhagen argues, in direct conflict with Browning, that 
Germans (and therefore the Wehrmacht and Einsatzgruppen) were innately and historically 
anti-Semitic.16 Thus, in a kind of Sonderweg interpretation, Germans were uniquely 
predisposed to anti-Jewish violence and enthusiastically carried out killings due to their 
hatred of Jews. Goldhagen states that even prior to 1933 fanatical anti-Jewish sentiments 
were strongly ingrained in Germany and that the men of the Einsatzgruppen, coming from 
this background, acted as ‘willing executioners’ of the Holocaust.17  
 
Goldhagen’s thesis, however, is deeply flawed and far too general in its scope. He 
argues essentially that these violently anti-Semitic views were not only held by all 
Germans, but that they pre-date Hitler. Omer Bartov criticises Goldhagen’s 
interpretation, countering that it does not take into account the effect of Nazi 
propaganda and dehumanisation that occurred after Hitler came to power, nor does it 
provide enough evidence for claiming that all (or most) Germans were in fact anti-
Semites.18 In Goldhagen’s interpretation, Hitler was merely a leader that brought this 
nascent and rabid anti-Semitism to centre stage in his policies, tapping into the 
groundswell of popular opinion against the Jews.19 If this was the case, then why did the 
Nazis put so much effort and money into anti-Jewish propaganda and promoting the 
Volksgemeinschaft? Furthermore, Browning counters that Goldhagen’s theory of a 
Germany that was uniquely anti-Semitic and violent before Hitler does not account for 
the successful denazification of Germany in the post-war period.20 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 D. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust  
(New York, 1996), pp. 39-43, 184-185, 279. 
17 Ibid., pp. 205-212. 
18 Bartov, Germany’s War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories (Cornell University  
Press, 2003), p. 129-131. 
19 Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, p. 416. 
20 Browning, Ordinary Men, p. 193. 
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The Crimes of the Wehrmacht Exhibition and the Vernichtungskriegsthese 
Browning and Goldhagen’s writings, along with new archival research on the Wehrmacht 
in the 1990s, led to the Vernichtungskriegsthese (war of annihilation thesis) which informed 
the controversial touring exhibition War of Annihilation: Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941 to 
1944 in Germany. This exhibition forced the German people to re-examine the perceived 
‘innocence’ of the Wehrmacht during the Second World War. The exhibition was highly 
controversial on its first showings through 1995-1999, and came under attack after 
several images of Russian POWs were misleadingly labelled as Jews.21 An investigation 
found that the finding of the exhibition was sound and it was pulled from public show 
for a significant revision where the errors were corrected. The exhibition then ran again 
after revision from 2001-2004, re-titled as Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a 
War of Annihilation 1941-1944.22 It exposed various Wehrmacht war crimes in great detail, 
including direct involvement in the Holocaust, the ‘mass death’ of POWs, the civilian 
‘starvation strategy’, the indiscriminate partisan war, reprisals and executions.23 
 
The historian Hannes Heer helped to orchestrate the Crimes of the Wehrmacht 
exhibition, and was instrumental in exposing key atrocities featured therein. The 
exhibition focused on two key massacres of Jews on the Eastern Front, Krivoy Rog and 
Kamenez in the Ukraine.24 The Wehrmacht was implicated heavily in both of these 
massacres, not only for assisting with rounding up Jews, but also in organising the 
                                                 
21 This unfortunate mistake was capitalised on by Holocaust denial advocates, including the denialist 
Journal of Historical Review, who were quick to dismiss the exhibition as fraudulent. See M. Weber, 
Mark, ‘Fraud Exposed in Defamatory German Exhibition’, The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 18, 
No. 6 (1999): 6. 
22 Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation, 1941-1944, Exhibition 
Outline, Hamburg Institute for Social Research, pp. 1-3, accessed online: http://www.verbrechen-der-
Wehrmacht.de/pdf/vdw_en.pdf .  
23 Ibid., pp. 9-11, 13-15, 20-22.  
24 Ibid., pp. 9-11. 
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operations and carrying out killings.25 Featuring chilling photographs of crowds of Jews 
being herded by Wehrmacht personnel to the outskirts of the towns to be shot, the 
presentation left no doubt as to Wehrmacht involvement.26 
 
Rolf-Dieter Müller’s Die Wehrmacht, printed in 1999, continued the trend of the 
Vernichtungskriegsthese, expanding on many of the issues of extermination and atrocity 
raised by the Crimes of the Wehrmacht exhibition.27 The historian Omer Bartov also 
contended that the Wehrmacht was a willing participant in genocide, and that the 
Wehrmacht was in fact a profoundly Nazi institution, far from the apolitical force in the 
orthodox interpretation. Though Bartov rejects Goldhagen’s thesis of ‘willing 
executioners,’ he posits that Wehrmacht soldiers embraced Nazism and that ‘the unique 
features of the Nazi genocidal enterprise illustrate an important characteristic of state-
organised industrial killing, whereby the fabrication of elusive enemies makes everyone 
into a potential killer.’28 He sees the conflict in the East as a brutal, ideologically charged 
war of extermination, with a largely Nazified Wehrmacht participating freely in atrocities. 29 
 
Recently, new sources have come to light, taken from transcripts of secretly 
recorded POW conversations. Many of these recordings are of Luftwaffe personnel, but 
a large number are captured soldiers from the Heer. The recordings were made in British 
and American POW camps during and after the war, without the prisoner’s knowledge, 
and so serve as remarkable insights into soldiers’ actual mindsets, free from coercion or 
                                                 
25 Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation, 1941-1944, exhibition 
outline, Hamburg Institute for Social Research, p. 3, accessed online http://www.verbrechen-der-
Wehrmacht.de/pdf/vdw_en.pdf . 
26 Ibid., p. 11. 
27 R. Müller ‘Die Wehrmacht – Historische Last und Verantwortung: Die Historiographie im 
Spannungsfeld von Wissenschaft und Vergangenheitsbewältigung’, (Munich, 1999), pp. 3-35, from 
Shepard, Ben, ‘The Clean Wehrmacht, The War of Extermination, and Beyond,’ The Historical 
Journal, Vol. 52, Iss. 2 (2009): 457.  
28 Bartov, ‘Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust’ 
The American Historical Review, Vol.103, No.3 (1998): 786. 
29 See Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. 68-69, 78, 83.  
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self preservation. Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing, and Dying collects and translates these 
sources and gives historians a new insight into the mindset of German fighting men in 
the Second World War.30  
 
The conversational and candid nature of the secret recordings allows 
unprecedented access to the thoughts and outlook of men of all ranks in the Wehrmacht, 
and the extent of the atrocities they committed. The recordings are extremely useful in 
ascertaining the attitude and feelings of average German soldiers towards the Nazis, the 
Jews and the Holocaust. For the purposes of this thesis these recordings reinforce the 
disturbing findings of Browning and the Crimes of the Wehrmacht exhibition, but also allow 
an insight into the extent to which these soldiers conformed to National Socialist 
indoctrination. They will be utilised extensively later in this study. 
 
Source Limitations 
 
This research will be based heavily on the testimonies of perpetrators, which although 
problematic, are in Browning’s words the closest we can get to a ‘smoking pistol’ when 
studying the Holocaust.31 Transcripts of captured German POWs, interrogations, war 
diaries and memoirs make up the bulk of these testimonies, with many of these 
transcripts found in translation in Soldaten and other secondary sources. Perpetrator 
testimonies have their own unique strengths and weaknesses as historical sources, which 
need to be addressed before their use. Those that exist as secretly recorded conversations 
of German prisoners have a completely different tone and authenticity when compared 
to court testimonies and memoirs - sources which can be quite obviously biased towards 
exonerating the defendant or author.  
                                                 
30 S. Neitzel and H. Welzer, Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing, and Dying (Brunswick, Scribe 
Publications, 2012), Prologues vii-x, pp. 3-7, 45-46. 
31 Browning, Collected Memories: Holocaust History and Postwar Testimony  
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), p. 36. 
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Post-war interviews and memoirs are distanced from events by time and the 
vagaries of memory, but POW transcripts and immediate post-war testimonies describe 
events fresh in the soldiers’ minds, months rather than years ago. These newly 
declassified sources offer a snapshot of the minds of Wehrmacht soldiers (albeit defeated 
ones) that is unparalleled. The clandestine nature of the POW recordings also means that 
the soldiers were free to converse on what they wished, without questions being guided 
by an interrogator (though in some cases an undercover mole was indeed present) or an 
oral historian. The reactions of the audience at times are as important as the stories 
related by the speaker, with shock, indifference or laughter often shattering 
preconceptions. Such peer reaction would be muted or non-existent in oral history or 
court documents, and provides an additional insight into the perceived norms of the 
Wehrmacht soldiers.  
 
To quote Neitzel and Welzer, when looking at perpetrator testimony ‘narratives 
are as much about relationships as they are about content’.32 Events may be exaggerated 
or even invented to suit the storyteller’s motives, and thus transcripts of conversations 
must be used with caution. Particulars, such as numbers and places, may blur and distort 
and key actors may be merged for narrative simplicity. In this case, however, instead of 
the specifics of stories, it is perhaps more important to look at the attitudes of the 
Wehrmacht soldiers to National Socialism and atrocities, and how they converse.  
 
These conversations can only give us testimonies of defeated Wehrmacht soldiers 
however, and their conversations need contextualisation and background. Post-war 
soldier testimony, war diaries, memoirs and letters home are valuable sources which will 
be explored, but must also be approached cautiously. Many of the authors have a vested 
interest in distancing or absolving themselves of war crimes, and incriminating truths can 
                                                 
32 Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, p. 104. 
 15 
often be covered up or downplayed. It is therefore important to discuss the specific 
weaknesses of using direct perpetrator testimony alone to tell the story of the Wehrmacht’s 
war.  
 
It can be argued that by focusing on perpetrator accounts and ignoring victim 
accounts, particularly in the case of the Holocaust, historians gain a skewed version of 
the truth. Christopher Browning has strongly advocated – and been criticised for - the 
use of perpetrator testimony to understand the Holocaust. Browning has replied to these 
concerns, agreeing that perpetrator testimony can be problematic, but arguing that when 
treated carefully and backed up with other evidence, it is an extremely useful evidence 
base. 33 For example, Soviet villagers could hardly be asked to identify their tormenters 
between SS, Wehrmacht or Einsatzgruppen - not only were German uniforms broadly 
similar but most civilian victims could hardly have had any concept of the invaders as 
anything other than ‘the Germans’. Perpetrator testimony also can be the only extant 
record in many cases, such as in operations where all victims were silenced. 
 
Nevertheless, to deal with the perceived and real weaknesses of direct perpetrator 
testimony it is necessary to use a range of other sources. Government documents and 
other ‘traditional’ archival sources, such as military orders and memos, have a strong 
historiographical tradition and are easily accessible to the historian. However, they have 
their own unique limitations. Government and military documents can provide insight 
into attempts to indoctrinate the Wehrmacht or to issue orders, but not necessarily the 
actual results on the ground. As such, they must be framed by the actions which 
followed, which again is often extant only in perpetrator testimony.  
 
                                                 
33 Browning, Collected Memories, pp. 3-17, 35-36. See also Ordinary Men, Preface p. xvi-xx. 
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As a final note, the primary sources used in this thesis are limited to those that 
can be found in translation. Luckily, as the field is well studied, many documents have 
been translated into English in source collections, and even more primary sources have 
been translated by historians and exist in secondary sources. Whenever this thesis quotes 
from German primary accounts in secondary sources, the secondary sources’ translation 
is used. Where there are multiple translations of the same document; the most recent 
translation is used. 
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Soldiers Views on Nazism, Racial Policy and the ‘Jewish 
Question’ 
 
  
The Ostkrieg occurred in the context of far reaching cultural issues, some unique to the 
Third Reich. Latent and promoted anti-Semitism and social-psychological pressures 
within Nazi Germany framed much of the soldiers’ understanding of the world, and 
membership of the Volksgemeinschaft called for a cultural identity which rejected and 
denigrated the non-German: in particular the Jew and the Bolshevik Slav. Since the 
defeat of Germany in 1918, Bolshevism and Jewry had been made scapegoats for the 
travails of the nation, and pre-war National Socialist propaganda handily blended the two 
into the catch-all term: ‘Jewish Bolshevism’. 34 By combining the two, the Nazis both 
concentrated the threat and further demonised the Soviet Union as harbourer of both.  
 
We can see from the attitudes in Soldaten, however, that the picture is more 
complex than a cleanly indoctrinated Wehrmacht. While the Waffen-SS, which operated as 
a military arm of the Nazi Party, was until 1943 made up of volunteers who underwent a 
significant indoctrination process, the Wehrmacht was a traditional conscript army. The 
Wehrmacht in Barbarossa consisted of over three million men, which is an incredibly large 
sample base and makes generalisation difficult.35 Instead of indoctrination, however, the 
general attitude demonstrated by these captured soldiers seems to be one of 
ambivalence.36  Neitzel and Welzer argue in Soldaten that soldiers ‘did not, in the main, 
have a political opinion on the National Socialist state, the dictatorship, or the 
persecution of Jews.’37 Despite sometimes ambivalent attitudes towards the regime, 
however, evidence shows that soldiers’ opinions in general were not strong enough to 
stop the men from committing atrocities. It will be shown that individual ideology - or 
                                                 
34 Haider, War Diary, pp. 336, in Hannes, ‘Killing Fields’, 80. 
35 L. Clark, Kursk: The Greatest Battle: Eastern Front 1943, (London: Headline Review, 2012), p. 73. 
36 Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, p. 226, 231, 248.  
37 Ibid., p. 226. 
 18 
lack thereof - was not an important factor in either preventing or causing the bulk of 
killings on the Ostfront.  
 
Soldiers had varying views on the regime and its racial policies, and their attitudes 
can give us some background to the actions that came later. However, Landsers views can 
sometimes seem contradictory. One POW, ranting about Hitler’s warmongering, 
lamented that ‘I still have no idea of where the Nazis are going to land us in the end. 
That swine with the brown shirt!’38 then, in the same conversation remarked that ‘Our 
racial policy is excellent, also the Jewish question, and the entire legislation for preserving 
the purity of German blood. That law is really first-class.’39 This juxtaposition seems odd, 
but underlines the fact that one did not have to necessarily support or believe in the 
entirety of the National Socialist cause to embrace Nazi anti-Semitism and racial laws. 
 
Another conflicting account from the POW recordings speaks highly of Hitler’s 
personality cult and German nationalism while simultaneously doubting the Führer’s 
leadership: 
 
Vetter: Whatever you think of National Socialism, Adolf Hitler is the leader and he has 
given the German people a very great deal up till now. At last we were able once more to 
be proud of our nation. Once should never forget that [....] Despite the fact that I’m 
convinced he will become her grave-digger. 
         Wöffen: Yes, her grave-digger. 40 
 
Such gloomy predictions can in some part be explained by the POWs situation - 
imprisoned and defeated - but it drives home the point again that one did not have to be 
a rabidly devoted Nazi to feel a sense of pride about what National Socialism had 
achieved. Despite the image of Hitler as Germany’s grave-digger, Vetter viewed Hitler as 
a great benefactor.   
                                                 
38 SRM 45, 10 February, TNA, WO 208/4133, Ibid., p. 231.  
39 Ibid.  
40 SRA 5835, 22 March 1945, TNA WO 208/4135, Ibid., pp. 209-210.  
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Anti-Semitism also comes through in the POW testimony, though it is not clear 
to what extent it was due to Nazi propaganda or merely the result of a broadly 
conservative outlook amongst Wehrmacht soldiers. In this case it takes the form of 
blaming opposition to Germany on Jewish influence in other nations:  
 
Holscher: It’s very strange that they are always against us.  
Holscher: As Adolf said, it’s possibly all due to the Jews. 
Von Bastian: Both England and America are under the influence of the Jews.41 
 
This is a continuation of the ‘stab in the back’ myth, in which Jews were blamed for 
Germany’s defeat in World War I. This myth was used by Hitler as a propaganda tool 
during his rise to power. It is clear that von Bastion subscribes to this myth; however it is 
interesting how Holscher doesn’t seem so sure, and mitigates his statement by saying ‘As 
Adolf said’.42 This could show a respect for the Führer, but some doubt when it came to 
Hitler’s beliefs on Jews. It is possible that the two soldiers show different levels of 
conformity to Nazi ideology in this regard. However, this is far from the most explicit 
account of anti-Semitism from the POW transcripts.  
 
Röttlander, an imprisoned Leutnant, recounted a story of a friend in the Wehrmacht 
who had been involved in a mass execution on the Eastern Front, in which entire villages 
were liquidated. Entire communities of Jews were ‘driven out mercilessly’, then executed 
in mass graves. The troops then had to cover the bodies in earth, with ‘some of them 
were still moving in the hole, children and all’. 43 This kind of work apparently took a toll 
on soldier’s mental state, as the Leutnant described afterwards that his friend’s nerves 
were ‘absolutely shattered’.44 His listener responded sympathetically ‘Well, what on earth 
                                                 
41 SRM 33, 31 January 1942, TNA, WO 208/4136, Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, p. 131. 
42 It is important to note here that for privacy reasons many of the names used in the transcripts are 
pseudonyms. For the purposes of this thesis however, this is of little concern. 
43 SRM 914 20 September 1941, TNA, WO 208/4139, Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, p. 235. 
44 Ibid. 
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can you do if it is ordered by a higher authority?’45 The listener’s rhetorical question is 
telling: clearly this man was no willing executioner.  
 
Another Wehrmacht POW, Rudolf Müller, described unknowingly adapting a 
truck into a movable gas chamber in Russia, then being brought before a German 
military tribunal for refusing to release the truck to be used for any more executions: 
 
Müller: I was supposed to adapt the truck by installing rubber inserts, I didn’t know what 
for, so I did it. The truck was sent out and placed at the disposal of local command [....] 
When the driver returned, he was pale as a ghost...He said, ‘They loaded civilians into the 
back. Next to me [sat] a SS man with a pistol on his lap who ordered me to drive’[....] 
After a half an hour, they arrived at a pit [....] He reversed and opened the hatch, and 
they tumbled out. Dead from the exhaust fumes. The next day, I received orders to 
deliver the truck to the local command. I said the truck wasn’t going anywhere. So I was 
brought up before a military tribunal for disobedience. 46 
 
Müller was obviously disgusted by the use of ‘his’ truck for executions, and his revulsion 
was enough to prompt him to refuse orders and risk punishment. It could also show that 
Wehrmacht personnel sometimes had to be coerced into helping commit atrocities, though 
the veracity of the pistol story above must be called into some question. Müller’s cellmate 
was equally shocked and disgusted by the story, and the revelation that the Wehrmacht 
driver was coerced: 
 
Reimbold: Dear God. 
Müller: They forced the driver. There was a fellow with a pistol next to him. And they 
hauled me up on charges.  
Reimbold: And that’s happening in the name of Germany. No telling what’s going to 
happen to us.47  
 
Clearly Müller and Reimbold were unaware of the extent of atrocities on the Eastern 
Front if the events in this story were in any way surprising. Though Müller was a 
mechanic in charge of a rear echelon motor pool, rather than a frontline soldier, both 
                                                 
45 Ibid., p. 236 
46 Room conversation, Müller-Reimbold, 22 March 1945, NARA, RG 165, Entry 179, Box 530, Ibid., 
pp. 134-135.  
47 Ibid., p. 135.  
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men seem legitimately shamed and disgusted that these types of actions were ‘happening 
in the name of Germany’. This account also confirms the fact that resources of Ostheer 
units in rear areas were approved and requisitioned for use in mass murder by the SS. It 
also shows us that knowledge of the Holocaust was not necessarily widespread amongst 
troops in rear areas, and that approval for the Final Solution (or at least the Wehrmacht’s 
role in it) was far from universal amongst Ostheer troops. 
 
 High ranking Officers were also critical of atrocities on the Eastern front. 
Generalleutnant Friedrich von Broich lamented the indiscriminate killings of civilians as 
tarnishing the repute of a once proud German army:  
 
Broich: All we’ve achieved is that our reputation as soldiers and Germans has been 
completely besmirched. People say: “You carry out all the orders when people are to 
be shot, whether it is right or wrong.” No one objects to the shooting of spies, but 
when whole villages, the entire population, including the children, is wiped out 
[...] as in Poland or Russia, then, my God, one can say it is pure murder.48 
  
 
Generalleutnant von Broich fits the stereotype of the ‘Good German’ officer, a proud 
member of a military steeped in rich tradition. He is therefore horrified by orders 
commanding genocide, the destruction of villages and the killing of children. He is 
shocked by what he sees as a common Wehrmacht attitude of following these orders 
regardless of moral consequences. But more disturbingly, even as a general he seems to 
be powerless to do anything to stop it. 49 If such a high ranking general was powerless to 
resist, how must enlisted men have felt?  
 
It bears mentioning here the Wehrmacht’s strong tradition of harsh discipline and 
total obedience to the chain of command. Omer Bartov cites these traditions, and the 
‘draconian punishments’ applied in cases of disobedience, as significant factors in 
                                                 
48 SRGG 782, 21 January 1944, TNA, WO 208/4167, Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, p. 147. My 
emphasis. 
49 Generalleutnant was a Wehrmacht rank equivalent to Major General, or a two star General.  
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‘maintaining unit cohesion under the most adverse combat conditions’.50 Even though 
Browning asserts that none of the Einsatzgruppen men studied were ever executed or 
punished harshly for refusing to take part in killing actions, refusing to shoot was ‘a very 
uncomfortable prospect within the framework of a tight-knit unit stationed abroad 
among a hostile population, so that the individual had virtually nowhere else to turn for 
support and social contact’.51 This created an environment in which atrocities, if ordered 
by generals and officers, were more likely to occur even against the wishes of the troops. 
These structures of discipline and peer pressure do not absolve Wehrmacht troops of guilt, 
or to say that unordered and wanton atrocities did not happen, but are simply factors in 
the structure of the Wehrmacht that helped Landsers become an effective tool in Hitler’s 
Final Solution on the Eastern Front. 
 
Indeed, not all Wehrmacht soldiers reacted with revulsion when confronted with 
atrocities; in fact some seemed to actively revel in bloodshed. Moving away from POW 
conversations, a soldier recounts an example in post-war testimony:  
 
Our returning comrades-in-arms tell us that they had to shoot several Jewish families... 
from smaller villages located in the area around the convent...One of the company...said, 
in his exact words, ‘Jew brain, that tastes good.’ He said they had just shot Jews, and 
their brains had sprayed him right in the face.52 
 
It is possible that the statement about ‘Jew brain’ is merely bravado, but shows a level of 
desensitisation that is hard to imagine even for veterans of the brutal war in the East. It 
raises questions as to how normalised these kind of violent events against civilians were. 
Almost certainly this soldier had committed shootings of Jewish civilians before. 
However, recollections like this are not typical, while some may have relished atrocities; 
                                                 
50 Bartov, Hitler’s Army, p. 59. 
51 Browning, Ordinary Men, p. 185. 
52 R. Erren, Testimony p. 33, translated in Heer, ‘Killing Fields,’ 85. 
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most seemed uncomfortable with them, particularly when they involved women and 
children.53  
 
An excellent illustration of this comes in the transcripts; interestingly the shooter 
in this case, Fried, is a member of the Wehrmacht Luftwaffe, whilst his conversation partner 
is Bentz is Wehrmacht Heer, though it is not clear if he served on the Ostfront.54 The 
incident recounted occurs in Poland. 
 
Bentz: I think we’ve adopted the wrong attitude to [the] racial question. It’s utter 
nonsense to say the Jew has nothing but bad qualities.  
Fried: I once took part in it myself [...] during the Polish campaign [....] An SS captain or 
whatever he was said: “Would you like to come along for half-an-hour? Get a tommy-
gun and let’s go.”55 So I went along. I had an hour to spare so we went to a kind of 
barracks and slaughtered 1,500 Jews. [....] They had been attacked at night by Jewish 
partisans [....] I thought about it afterwards - it wasn’t very “pleasant.” 
Bentz: Were there only Jews? 
Fried: Only Jews and a few partisans [....] it wasn’t very “pleasant”. 
Bentz: What - you fired, too? 
Fried: Yes, I did. [....] There were women and children there too! [....] there were whole 
families, some were screaming terribly and some were just stupid and apathetic.56 
 
The Wehrmacht Heer soldier had just finished describing his mixed feelings about the Nazi 
attitude towards the ‘Jewish Question’, and is obviously shocked to hear his comrade 
speak so flippantly being offered a part in an SS execution of Jews. He cannot believe 
that Fried took part in the killings. The Wehrmacht Luftwaffe man, on the other hand, 
seems to regret the incident vaguely after the fact, only to insult his victims in their final 
moments. Accounts like show very starkly the diverse psychological and ideological 
worldviews and opinions these troops held. Wide reaching generalisations about the bulk 
                                                 
53 See Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, p. 146. 
54 Soldaten does not give any details about ‘Bentz’ other than that his rank, but given that the account is 
dated April 1943 and he is from the Wehrmacht Heer it is logical that he was captured by the Western 
Allies during the African campaign. If part of the Afrika Korps, it is likely that he had not seen service 
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of atrocities committed there - hence his absolute surprise at Fried’s assertion.  
55 The English colloquial term ‘tommy-gun’ is used repeatedly in the translations of Soldaten as a 
colloquial term for ‘sub-machine gun’. It this case it likely refers to the MP35 or MP38 sub-machine 
gun used by the Waffen-SS at the time of the Polish campaign. See C. Bishop, The Encyclopedia of 
Weapons of WWII (New York: Sterling Publishing Company, 2002), pp. 259-260. 
56 SRA 3948, 16 April 1943, TNA, WO 208/4143, Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, p. 141. 
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of the Wehrmacht being naturally anti-Semitic ‘willing executioners’ are clearly not 
supported by the evidence.  
 
 This assertion is borne out by Nazi policies themselves. In late 1943, Hitler 
decided that the Wehrmacht was not conforming ideologically to his satisfaction, and that 
he needed his own political officers within the Wehrmacht to promote National Socialism 
and cohesion. This decision led to the formation of the Nationalsozialistische 
Führungsoffiziere (NSFO), who essentially operated as Nazi commissars and ‘leadership 
officers’ within the Wehrmacht.57 Hitler’s need to establish the NSFO shows again that 
political conformity was far from omnipresent within the Wehrmacht. Moreover, the 
NSFO was plagued with problems and opposition and was generally disliked by the army 
during its implementation.58   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 R. Quinnett ‘The German Army Confronts the NSFO’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.13, 
No. 1 (1978): 53. 
58 Ibid., 53-55. 
 
 25 
Official Wehrmacht Policy and Doctrine 
 
  
Official Wehrmacht doctrine for Barbarossa largely went along with Hitler’s directive for a 
‘war of extermination’.59 By instituting harsh, far reaching directives on the treatment of 
partisans and the civilian population in the area of operations, the Armed Forces High 
Command (OKW) created an environment in which atrocities were not only inevitable, 
but in line with military doctrine.  The OKW can be implicated directly in atrocities on 
the Eastern Front through these orders, issued before and during Operation Barbarossa. 
These orders show that the Wehrmacht was directed to act as anything but a traditional 
army; they were given rules of engagement that conformed to a war of annihilation, a 
conflict in which Soviet civilians and Jews were legitimate targets. Particularly loose rules 
of engagement surrounding ‘partisans’ allowed Wehrmacht troops essentially free rein to 
liquidate entire populations (both during their advance and behind the lines), ostensibly 
in the name of security in occupied areas. These orders, drafted in Wehrmacht offices and 
barracks, would allow the Ostheer to take on the role of independent executioners if 
needed. As it turned out, they would be. 
 
On 30 March 1941, three months before Operation Barbarossa began; Hitler 
called a conference with major military leaders, including several high ranking Wehrmacht 
generals. The conference was recorded in notes by Generaloberst Franz Halder.60 In the 
Führer’s words, the coming war in the East would be entirely different to the war that 
had been fought in the West; as a ‘struggle between two Weltanschauungen (worldviews)’.61 
Hitler stressed to his generals that they must divorce themselves from thoughts of 
                                                 
59 F. Halder, War Journal of Franz Halder, II, p. 337, in Nazism: A History in Documents and 
Eyewitness Accounts, 1919-1945, ed. by J. Noakes and G. Prigham (University of Exeter, 1988), p. 
1086-1087. Original German available online at http://www.ns-archiv.de/krieg/1941/halder-
tagebuch.php .  
60 Generaloberst was the penultimate general rank in the Wehrmacht.  
61 Halder, War Journal p. 337, in Nazism, p. 1086.  
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‘soldierly comradeship’, as the war against the Soviets would be a ‘war of extermination’, 
requiring absolute ruthlessness.62 The immediate ‘destruction of the Bolshevik 
commissars and intelligentsia’ was a key first step in the invasion, the Führer emphasised, 
and he warned that if extreme measures were not taken then Communism would only 
rise again to threaten German security.63 
 
Under Hitler’s influence, the OKW began to draft up several key orders for the 
invasion, which would shape the conflict. Before the invasion, these documents were 
circulated down the chain of command to officers and soldiers. The Wagner-Heydrich 
agreement of 28 April 1941 was one of the first of these, allowing the Wehrmacht to work 
together and assist the Einsatzgruppen in its operations ‘mopping up’ Jews and Soviet 
intelligentsia behind Wehrmacht lines as the front advanced, in contrast to the invasion of 
Poland, where the Einsatzgruppen had operated largely independently.64 According to the 
agreement, the Einsatzgruppen’s purpose was ‘to protect the rear forces of the army in the 
conquered territory in the East.’65 Since the Einsatzgruppen were not a combat outfit, and 
not trained in military tactics, this pretence of rear area protection was clearly absurd. 
However, the agreement gave the special police battalions the support of the Wehrmacht, 
who would be called on again and again to assist in these mopping up operations.  
 
The ‘Barbarossa Decree’ was issued by Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, 
Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, on May 13, 1941. This document relaxed the 
threat of court martial for German soldiers in the coming war on the Eastern Front, 
stating that: ‘punishable offences committed against enemy civilians, until further notice, 
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no longer come under the jurisdiction of the courts-martial and the summary courts-
martial.’66 This decree removed enemy civilians from the protection of military law, 
effectively giving German soldiers free rein to deal with them as they saw fit. By 
removing the protection of military law, Wehrmacht generals were effectively condoning 
and encouraging Aktionen against civilians.67  
 
The ‘Commissar Order,’ in line with the conference of 30 March, ordered the 
immediate execution of any captured Soviet political commissars. This order, drafted in 
May 1941, but not issued until 6 June, proclaimed that ‘commissars are the initiators of 
barbaric, Asiatic methods of warfare...they must be shot at once on principle...the 
protection of POWs guaranteed by international law will not be accorded to them.’68 
Browning also remarks that this was not limited to army commissars; any civil 
communist functionaries ‘considered to be anti-German’ were also to be executed.69 This 
order was a key turning point in Wehrmacht policy, as it directly contravened the Geneva 
Convention and served as an official army approval for the immediate execution of 
political undesirables by their captors, even if surrendering. It showed that the Wehrmacht 
general staff were preparing for an ideologically charged war against Bolshevism.70 
 
Almost simultaneously, another order titled ‘Guidelines for the Behaviour of the 
Troops in Russia’ exhorted soldiers to see ‘Bolshevism [as] the deadly enemy of the 
                                                 
66 ‘Decree for the Conduct of Courts-Martial in the District ‘Barbarossa’ and for Special Measures of 
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National Socialist German people’, and called for its absolute destruction.71 This order 
mirrored the words of Hitler’s earlier meetings with Wehrmacht generals, making it clear 
that the invasion of the Soviet Union called for ‘ruthless and energetic action against 
Bolshevik agitators, guerrillas, saboteurs, and Jews, and total elimination of all active or 
passive resistance.’72 The wording was clear: Jews were now legitimate targets for military 
action as much as snipers and saboteurs; marked as partisans by virtue of birth. Defined 
along the same lines of enemy combatants, they were to be treated as a potential threat 
and eliminated.  
 
The Wehrmacht also issued several orders in country, regarding policy in the 
occupied areas. Many of these related to the treatment of Soviet civilians, and the so 
called ‘starvation strategy’. On 2 May 1941 State Secretaries of the Nazi Party concluded 
that Germany’s war could ‘only be continued if the whole of the Wehrmacht is fed from 
Russia...Tens of millions of people will undoubtedly die of starvation if we take what we 
need...’73 Officials planned to exploit the occupied territories ruthlessly for Germany’s 
benefit, with no regards to civilian casualties. In line with this, the Wehrmacht OKH issued 
this directive to troops on 1 November 1941 stating:  
 
In the fight against Bolshevism we are concerned with the survival or destruction of our 
people...[the] German soldier will be tempted to share their provisions with the 
[occupied] people. They must, however, say to themselves: ‘Every gram of bread or 
other food that I [give] to [civilians] I am withholding from the German people and thus 
my own family [...]’ In the face of starving women and children German soldiers must 
remain steadfast. If they refuse to do so they are endangering the nutrition of our own 
people.74  
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Again the conflict is framed in explicitly racial and ideological terms. Soviet citizens must 
die so that Germans may live. The starvation of Soviets is justified as necessary and 
prudent as a military measure, to maintain the integrity of Wehrmacht supply. 
 
 The OKW shaped the Wehrmacht’s role in the conflict along with Nazi ideals and 
the Jewish-Bolshevik construct. Wehrmacht Generals explicitly couched the conflict in 
Hitler’s terms, as a desperate war of ideologies which required fresh rules of engagement 
and the absolute destruction of Jewish-Bolshevik elements. By issuing orders like the 
‘Barbarossa Decree’, ‘Guidelines for the Behaviour of the Troops’ and the ‘Commissar 
Order’, they structured the Wehrmacht’s rules of engagement to better suit Hitler’s war of 
extermination. The Wagner-Heydrich agreement enabled the Wehrmacht to work more 
closely with the Einsatzgruppen, something that had not occurred in Poland. Through 
these orders, the OKW framed the conflict as a ‘win-or-die’ struggle between Germans 
on one side, and Judeo-Bolshevik hordes on the other. The task of Ostheer soldiers’ was 
made clear: triumph by any means. 
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Russian Civilians and POWs 
 
  
While the Wehrmacht will be implicated in actions against Jews, soldiers were also 
responsible for the deaths of countless Soviet civilians and POWs. The brutality of the 
German forces towards the civilian population on the Eastern Front is well-known and 
in keeping with Nazi stereotypes about degenerate, subhuman Slavs. This chapter will 
show that once Soviet civilians and POWs were viewed as expendable by Wehrmacht 
soldiers, the Wehrmacht could no longer be considered a traditional army waging an 
‘honourable’ war. The massive civilian casualties suffered by the Soviet Union are the 
most obvious indication that this was no ordinary war - but a racially charged war of 
annihilation in line with National Socialist ideology.75 To what extent the soldiers of the 
Ostheer subscribed to this ideology, however, is less clear.  
 
The Partisan ‘Threat’ 
Despite the Wehrmacht’s anticipation of a large scale partisan harassment behind the lines, 
actual Soviet partisan activity was limited in the first six months of Barbarossa. The 
Soviets were taken off guard by the Wehrmacht’s lightning advance, and large pockets of 
troops were bypassed, cut off and eventually surrounded.76 Janus Zawodny notes that 
‘ineptness of action (lack of experience) [...] losses, a considerable degree of collaboration 
with the Germans [and] the collapse of territorial organisations’ led to an ineffective 
partisan movement early on.77 Many of these troop pockets surrendered immediately 
rather than taking the initiative and acting autonomously as a partisan force.78 
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Testimony from R. Erren of the 727th Infantry Regiment backs up this image of 
a scattered, disorganised partisan force, and describes the reality of the situation in 
occupied Belarus in 1941: 
 
During the period from the beginning of August until, I think, mid October 1941, our 
unit performed occupational service in Slonim and in smaller localities in the 
surrounding area [....] During this period our company had, as far as I can recall, one 
skirmish with partisans.79 
 
 
One contact with partisans in three months does not give the impression of insecurity or 
a full scale partisan war. Another testimony from the same unit continues, stating that, 
instead of partisans, ‘The largest group of persons shot by Schaffitz were Jews and had 
not the least bit to do with the fighting.’80 It seems that the Wehrmacht had very little 
fighting against actual partisans to do behind the lines at all. In fact, Timothy Mulligan 
argues that the ‘fragmented and largely unpopular partisan movement’ in occupied Soviet 
territories posed ‘no major threat to the German occupation’ until 1942.81  
 
Despite this, the troops were told that the threat of Bolshevik partisans was very 
real. ‘Do You Know the Enemy?’ was a pamphlet distributed to troops in June before 
the invasion, warning Landsers to be prepared to fight dedicated Red Army partisans 
behind the lines, and of asymmetric partisan tactics like dressing as civilians. ‘Be hard and 
remorseless whenever you encounter such tactics’, the pamphlet encouraged, continuing; 
‘it is irrelevant whether soldiers or civilians are concerned.’82 It is easy to see how 
ordinary soldiers, under combat stresses, constant peril and sometimes extreme 
deprivations, would come to see the brutal rules of engagement surrounding partisans 
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and civilians as necessary, particularly when accounting for the years of racial and 
political indoctrination against the Slavic-Bolshevik menace. The rigid, disciplinary 
structure of the Wehrmacht only reinforced this tendency. It is not a huge step from 
targeting Soviet civilians indiscriminately as suspected partisans, to seeing all Jews as 
suspected partisans that must also be eliminated. 
 
Russian POWs  
The Wehrmacht’s treatment of Soviet POWs became increasingly brutal and 
counterproductive as the campaign went on.83  Konrad Jarausch, a Wehrmacht soldier, had 
the task of guarding many of these POWs. From his letters home, Jarausch was a 
moderate, intelligent man, and he empathised to some degree with the plight of the 
Russians, who were clearly being starved in the camps as food was redirected to the 
Wehrmacht. He writes in letters home on the situation and his superior’s outlook: 
 
[...] above all there is a constant pressure to economize. We can’t satisfy the prisoners’ 
hunger...This afternoon a prisoner was shot in front of our eyes, just as he was struggling 
through a barbed wire fence to grab a cauliflower from a nearby garden. They had fired 
warning shots and the guard was certainly right to shoot, but it’s made us all reflect on 
how insignificant a single life is.84 
 
The juxtaposition of Jarausch’s reflective philosophising and frank justification of the 
shooting of the starving Soviet prisoner is striking, especially since he shows some 
empathy for the Prisoners plight. This account shows an attitude where, if regulations are 
followed, even a regrettable killing can be rationalised and justified as ‘right’ within set 
rules of engagement.  
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84 K. H. Jarausch, Letter from Eastern Front, translated in K. H. Jarausch and R., Kohn, Reluctant 
Accomplice: A Wehrmacht Soldier’s Letters from the Eastern Front (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2011), pp. 274, 280. 
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However, POWs were still viewed more favourably than the Jews. Jarausch, who 
obviously lamented the suffering of Russian POWs – contrastingly stated in a letter 
home on November 6, 1941 that ‘Bolshevism is being ruthlessly stamped out, wherever 
we encounter it. The same thing goes for the Jewish element. Today in particular I’m 
under the impression of such actions. Thus the brevity [of this letter]. [...]’85 Now while it 
could be said that his letters were being filtered or coerced in some way, this did nothing 
to stop him writing favourably and with some sadness about the Slavic soldiers under his 
guard. It is clear that this man was not without empathy. That empathy, however, did not 
appear to extend entirely to Judeo-Bolshevik elements. More letters expand on his views, 
and although he seems to feel some resignation and sadness about the plight of the Jews, 
his solution is less than empathetic. 
 
But our troops and the prisoners have to put up with so much – Jews barefoot in the 
snow86 [...] There are civilians among the prisoners, many who are just in shirtsleeves - 
especially the Jews. It would really be the most merciful thing if they would be taken out 
into the forest and bumped off, as the experts put it. But the whole thing is already more 
murder than war.87  
 
While Jarausch’s feeling for Jews moving past his camps are at best resigned, his solution 
is reflective of a desensitisation and acceptance of the status quo within the Wehrmacht, 
that is, that the fate of the Jews was sealed as enemies of the Reich. While these Jews 
have not been killed outright in an Aktionen, their fate once captured by the Nazis is 
grim.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 Jarausch, Letter from Eastern Front, in Reluctant Accomplice, p. 319.  
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., p. 325 
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Wehrmacht Involvement in the Holocaust on the  
Ostfront 
 
  
The final test comes in analysing the Wehrmacht’s actual conduct of war – to what degree 
did the Wehrmacht fight a ‘war of annihilation’, explicitly genocidal in nature? Was the 
Wehrmacht’s war fought largely within the confines of the Geneva Convention, with 
sporadic incidences of war crimes, or was the tone of the conflict one of extermination? 
Here soldier testimony will be reviewed in detail, particularly in case studies of Wehrmacht 
initiated killings of the Jews in the Belarusian SSR towns of Krupki, Lida and Slonim. It 
will be shown that while Wehrmacht troops showed varying degrees of enthusiasm for the 
task of killing Jews, they carried out their orders all the same, often independently - either 
before SS and Einsatzgruppen units arrived or in separate actions. Because the Wehrmacht 
Heer was on the frontline, it was the ‘first on the scene’ to begin the Holocaust in the 
East. It is not the purpose of this chapter to implicate the entirety of the Ostheer, over 
three million men, in the Holocaust.88 However, soldiers’ testimonies and attitudes tell of 
similar actions, and the level of troop brutalisation shows that the execution of Jews was 
not an unusual task for them. Although the Einsatzgruppen were the favoured unit for Jew 
killings, 89 it will be argued that the level of Wehrmacht participation in the Holocaust was 
far greater than previously thought.90 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 Clark, Kursk, p. 73. 
89 Nuremburg Documents PS-3257, as cited in Documents on the Holocaust, ed. by Y. Arad, Y. 
Gutman, A. Margaliot (Jerusalem and Oxford: Yad Vashem and Pergamon Press, 1987), p.  417. 
90 Wehrmacht soldiers also benefited directly from the deaths or deportations of Jews. Officers would 
requisition (loot) stores from purged Jewish homes, and Jewish loot became a legitimised part of the 
Wehrmacht’s supply chain. Konrad Jarausch describes in a letter home how normalised this was:   
‘We just need to be sure to ‘winterize’ our quarters. Today we got two oil lamps, one for down in the 
camp and one for our quarters, of course they were from Jewish homes.’ Of course the oil lamps were 
from Jewish families’ homes, the Jews of the Ostfront would not need them anymore. Jarausch’s 
comrades had made sure of that. Jarausch, Reluctant Accomplice, p. 271. 
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The Jewish-Bolshevik/Jewish-Partisan construct in practice. 
The Jewish-Partisan construct was established clearly in the more wide-sweeping army 
orders of Barbarossa, but proof of these orders carrying all the way to ground is 
demonstrated in the orders of field commanders. Generalmajor von Bechtolsheim issued a 
field order to his troops, the 707th Infantry Division, on September 10, 1941, three 
months into Barbarossa stating: ‘The Jewish population is Bolshevik and capable of any 
attitude hostile to Germany. In terms of how they are to be treated, there need be no 
guidelines.’91  This sort of reinforcement of the rules of engagement by officers in the 
field shows that the orders set down by the OKW were being followed, and it was no 
doubt necessary for the officers to reinforce them if they were to have an effect on the 
ground. This shows that the higher Wehrmacht orders for Barbarossa were more than just 
official dogma which could be divorced from soldiers themselves. In face these orders 
were being passed down to the troops through the chain of command and shaping their 
actions and mindset directly.    
 
Similarly, Generalfeldmarshall von Reichenau, commander of 6th Army in Operation 
Barbarossa, issued his own secret decree to his troops on 10 October, 1941, four months 
into the invasion. Known as the ‘Severity Decree’, it also reinforced the High 
Command’s rhetoric about the duty of Wehrmacht soldiers, but in even more politicised 
and anti-Semitic terms than von Bechtolsheim. Von Reichenau decreed that the German 
soldier on the Eastern front was not just a warrior but also ‘a bearer of ruthless national 
ideology and the avenger of bestialities [inflicted upon Germany] and racially related 
nations.’ Von Reichenau’s soldiers were expected to have a ‘full understanding for the 
necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry,’ and for the annihilation of 
                                                 
91 Der Kommandant in WeiBruthenien des Wehrmachtsbefehlshabers Ostland/Abt. la, Lagebericht, 
10.9.1941, BSA Minsk, 651-1-1, p. 25, in Heer, ‘Killing Fields’, 84. 
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partisan revolts behind the lines ‘which have always been caused by Jews’.92 According to 
von Reichenau’s orders, total ruthlessness in the East was required to secure Germany 
from ‘Asiatic-Jewish danger’.93 It is clear that von Reichenau took the implementation of 
a war of annihilation against the Jews and ‘Asiatics’ seriously. 
 
The 727th Infantry Regiment based in Slobin was issued orders stating that ‘all 
Jews were to be regarded as partisans if they were encountered outside their place of 
residence.’94As all partisans were to be shot on sight, any Jew leaving their house was an 
instant target. Another Wehrmacht officer recounted - in line with official policy - that 
‘[the] Jews are without exception identical with the concept of partisan.’95 Clearly the 
Jewish-Partisan construct was informing Ostheer actions on the ground.  
 
Case Study: Krupki 
The first case study, Krupki, demonstrates a situation in direct conflict with traditional 
historiographical views of the Wehrmacht. Here we see the Wehrmacht operating relatively 
independently to liquidate the resident Jews of Krupki quickly and efficiently. The 
accounts show that this was not the first operation of this kind that the troops had 
undertaken, hinting at an organised system of annihilation with killing protocols 
organised at the battalion level.   
 
In mid-1941 Krupki was a thriving town in the Belarusian SSR, with a significant 
Jewish minority. By the end of September 1941, almost all of them had been executed by 
                                                 
92 “Field Marshal v. Reichenau, Order Concerning Conduct of Troops in the Eastern Territories, 10 
October, 1941,” from ‘Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression’. Volume VIII. USGPO, Washington, 1946, 
pp.572-582, accessed online at: http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/USSR2.htm . An alternative 
translation of Reichenau’s decree is present in S. G. Fritz, Ostkrieg: Hitler's War of Extermination in 
the East (The University Press of Kentucky, 2011), pp. 97-98. Original German available online at 
http://www.ns-archiv.de/krieg/untermenschen/reichenau-befehl.php . 
93 “Field Marshal v. Reichenau, Order Concerning Conduct of Troops, pp.572-582, accessed online at: 
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/USSR2.htm . 
94 Inf. Rgt. 350, II. Bat., An das Regiment, 18.8.1941, BA-MA, RH 26-221-21, pp. 294-295, translated 
in Heer, ‘Killing Fields,’ 86. 
95 Kommandantur des Sicherungs-Gebietes WeiBruthenien/Abt. Ic, Lagebericht, 20.2.1942, 
BA-MA, RH 26-707-15, p. 4, in Ibid., 88. 
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the Wehrmacht 354th Infantry Regiment. Unteroffizier Richard Heidenreich states in his 
diary that his unit of the 354th Infantry Regiment had assisted the Einsatzgruppen in 
shooting Jews in a POW camp outside Minsk in September 1941.96 This was, however, 
an Einsatzgruppen operation. The executions in Krupki were, by contrast, largely instigated  
and executed by the Wehrmacht. Richard Heidenreich described the scene in his diary: 
 
In the evening our Second Lieutenant selected fifteen men with strong nerves [....] We 
waited for the morning in tense expectation. We were ready at 5 o’clock prompt, and the 
First Lieutenant explained what we were to do. There were approximately 1,000 Jews in 
the village of Krupki, and these all needed to be shot today [...]97 
 
The task was carried out methodically with full involvement of higher ranking officers. 
The unit set about gathering Jews from the town and taking them to the outskirts. 
Heidenreich describes what happened next. 
 
After our names were read out, the column marched to the nearest swamp [....] A 
second-lieutenant and a company sergeant-major were with us. Ten shots sounded, ten 
Jews were blown away. This went on until all were taken care of. Only a few of them 
kept their composure. The children clung to their mothers, women to their men. 98 
 
Another soldier in 12th Company corroborated this account, confirming that ‘shootings 
were carried out by the 2nd Platoon led by Master Sergeant Schrade.’ 99 12th Company 
were later involved in other Aktionen in the area as the following diary entry shows: 
 
From [Krupki] we carried out several so-called raids, and our task (mostly at night) was 
namely to cordon off and comb through the surrounding localities. There the resident 
Jews (men, women, and children) were taken prisoner and rounded up in the village [....] 
                                                 
96 True to Type: A Selection from Letters and Diaries of German Soldiers and Civilians Collected on 
the  Soviet-German Front, (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1945), p. 29 from W.W. Beorn, Descent 
Into Darkness: The Local Participation of the Wehrmacht in the Holocaust in Belarus, 1941-2, (PhD 
diss., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2011), p. 72. 
97 “Diary entry by Senior Private First Class Heidenreich,12th Company, 354th Infantry Regiment, 
62nd Infantry Division, Field P.O. No. 62: What I went through in Russia” in True To Type, pp. 30-32, 
“Jewish Virtual Library”, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/krupki.html. An 
alternative translation is available in Heer, ‘Killing Fields’, 86. 
98 Ibid. An alternative translation is available in Heer, ‘Killing Fields’, 84. 
99 Ibid., p. 31. Beorn, “Descent into darkness,” p. 83. 
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The usual procedure in these operations was to alternate with parts of 12 Co. 
After the Jews were rounded up...a place was selected and they were shot there [...]100  
 
The phrase ‘usual procedure’ indicates that the 354th regiment had carried out ‘mopping 
up’ operations to deal with Jews previously in other towns, and that the cooperation at 
the company level was routine, possibly alternating due to mental stress on the soldiers. 
Heidenreich goes on to describe further actions in the area, ‘A couple days later a similarly 
large number was shot in Kholoponichi [...] I was involved here too [...]’ and it becomes even 
clearer that Krupki is not an isolated incident, but that other massacres of the same scale 
occurred soon after.101  
 
Krupki is evidence that the Wehrmacht could and did undertake actions against 
Jews more or less independently. The account shows that by September 1941 at least 
Heidenreich’s company and another company within the 354th were extremely well 
organised when it came to liquidating Jewish populations of this size. The procedure was 
routine enough that a ballot system was in use to rotate the men who had to carry out 
the killings. This is evidence that the men did not relish the task; while the soldiers did 
‘their duty’ as they saw it, they were not bloodthirsty or mindless killers. In fact, 
psychological stresses on soldiers tasked with executing civilians were high: one of the 
key reasons that a more ‘sanitised’ answer to the Jewish question would eventually be 
required.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100 My emphasis. Strafsache gegen W. Schonemann, LG Koln 24 Ks 1/63, Sonderband K, Zeugen C, 
K., A., pp. 15f., 19f., 43f.; ibid., vol. 9, Zeugen M., R, pp. 13f., 15f.; ibid., vol. 10, Zeuge N., pp. 154f, 
Zeugenaussage M., 2.12.1963, pp. 53f, in Heer, ‘Killing Fields’, 84.  
101 True to Type: A Selection from Letters and Diaries of German Soldiers and Civilians Collected on 
the Soviet-German Front (London, 1961), pp. 29-32, in Ibid., 84-85. 
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Case Study - Lida and Slonim  
The Wehrmacht actions in the Belarusian towns of Lida and Slonim at the end of June 
1941 not only contradict the traditional view of the Ostheer as a ‘regular army’, but also 
tell of shocking mistreatment and sadistic torture of Jews by regular Wehrmacht soldiers 
very early in the campaign. The actions in Lida and Slonim occur at the end of June, 
1941, several months before the killings in Krupki. Again, it is clearly documented that 
Jews were killed en masse by regular army units. However, in Lida the killings took on 
another dimension of brutality. Two soldiers in the 161st Division give two different first 
hand accounts of what occurred:  
 
During the occupation of the city of Lida I was witness to the following incident: The 
leader of the regiment's mounted troops (Infantry Regiment 336, 161st Infantry 
Division) had 20 Jewish locals arrested [....] people from 16 to around 60 years of age. 
When they arrived outside the city limits, they severely mistreated them. They were 
beaten with rifle butts and tortured with bayonets; blood was flowing from both nose 
and mouth. Then they had to, under further mistreatment, dig a pit. When it was 
finished [they] were executed in the presence of all. There was no reason for this 
killing.102  
 
I can still remember how I saw a child grabbed by the head and then shot. The child was 
then thrown into a hole.103 
  
These separate accounts are important because it shows soldiers not only committing 
atrocities, but revelling in them. It is clear, however, that the observers are disgusted by 
what they see, perhaps because the killings involve children and the elderly. Such actions 
show a high level of brutalisation and organisation very early on in the campaign, rather 
than later, as both Bartov and Browning suggest. Another account illustrates the extent 
of the killings around Lida, and how they were structured along military terms: 
 
                                                 
102 Otto Wormuth, Außerordentliche Staatliche Kommission für die Feststellung und Untersuchung der 
Gräueltaten der deutsch-faschistischen Eindringlinge und ihrer Komplizen, und des Schadens, den sie 
den Bürgern, Kolchosen, öffentlichen Organisationen, staatlichen Betrieben und Einrichtungen der 
UdSSR zugefügt haben (From Hannes Heer, Stets zu erschießen sind Frauen, die in der Roten Armee 
dienen [Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995], 18 in Wildermuth, ‘Who Killed Lida's Jewish 
Intelligentsia?’, 9. 
103 Testimony of M., Erren, p. 1155, Heer, ‘Killing Fields,’ p. 85.  
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It is furthermore known to me that our company had to write so-called activity reports 
for the battalion. For this reason, we carried out patrols in the surrounding area during 
which Jews were seized and shot. In the reports, this was presented as if these persons 
had been shot while trying to escape.104 
 
This details the fulfilment of a sort of ‘Jew quota’ which the company was set, in the 
form of activity reports - something that was incentivised at battalion level. These 
soldiers of the Ostheer were desensitized extremely quickly - within days - incorporating 
Jew killing into their regular routines like standard combat patrols. It seems that they are 
conforming exactly to the rules of engagement set in place to ‘secure’ them.  
 
The Wehrmacht as Part of the Larger Holocaust 
Gerhard Erren, the Nazi area commissioner of Slonim, wrote disparagingly in January 
1942 of the Wehrmacht’s efficiency as a tool of mass murder.105 However, his critique 
serves more to underline the real scale of Wehrmacht atrocities, even while detailing their 
limitations: 
 
For a while, the Wehrmacht was mopping up the countryside on a grand scale; but 
unfortunately, only in localities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. 106 
 
In Erren’s estimation, it seems that if Belarus was made up entirely of towns with fewer 
than 1,000 inhabitants, neither the Einsatzgruppen nor the death camps would have been 
necessary. Ostheer units were perfectly capable of dealing with mop up operations in these 
areas on their own.  
 
Another roundabout indictment of the Wehrmacht comes from Wilhelm Kube, 
the chief of civil administration in Nazi Belorussia, in July 1942: 
 
Through an [...] already reported encroachment of the Rear Area, Army Group Center, 
our preparations for liquidating the Jews in the area around Glubokie have been 
                                                 
104 Testimony of H., Windisch, p. 1354, Ibid. 
105 Generalkommissar Kube an Reichskommissar Lohse, 31.7.1942, Nuremberg Document 
PS-3428, Heer, ‘Killing Fields’, p. 79.  
106 Ibid. 
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interrupted. The Rear Area, Army Group Center has, without consulting me, liquidated 
10,000 Jews whose systematic extermination we had...already planned.107 
 
Kube is annoyed because the system of extermination of which he is a key part has been 
bypassed. This shows that by mid-1942, the Nazi structure of annihilation was beginning 
to move away from emphasis on front line units, and towards the more efficient death 
camps. The careful bureaucratic chain of death has been bypassed, and to a functionary 
like Kube, this was inexcusable. However, it shows again the Wehrmacht was more than 
capable of efficiently exterminating large numbers of Jews in rear areas later in the war, 
independent of the imposed structure of the Final Solution. This was an unintended 
consequence of preparing the Wehrmacht so well for a war of annihilation.  
  
The clearest indication that Wehrmacht troops were overstepping their bounds as 
executioners of convenience comes in the occupied Ukraine. As described by an official 
in an internal memo, the ‘settling of the Jewish Question’ in Nazi occupied Ukraine was 
not as simple as in other parts of the Ostfront, with ‘[m]any cities [having] more than 50 
percent Jews’.108 Not only was the population of Jews higher, but Jews were integrated 
into Ukrainian society to a much higher level than in other parts of Eastern Front. In the 
words of the official:  
 
[...]these Jews carried out almost all the work in the skilled trades and even provided part of the labour 
for small - and medium-sized industries [....][Their] elimination was therefore bound to have profound 
economic consequences, including even direct effects on the military economy (supplies for 
troops).109 
 
The author is clearly worried, not about the Jews welfare, but on the effect their elimination has 
had on the occupied economies ability to support the Wehrmacht. In his mind, their elimination 
was counter-productive to the war effort, and Wehrmacht supply. He then relates what occurred to 
remove the Jews:  
                                                 
107 Ibid. 
108 Nuremburg Documents PS-3257, as cited in Documents on the Holocaust, p.  417. 
109 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
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[...] systematic shooting of the Jews was carried out by units of the Order Police [....] 
carried out entirely in public, with the assistance of Ukrainian militia; in many cases, 
regrettably, also with the voluntary participation of members of the Wehrmacht. 
These Aktionen included aged men, women, and children of all ages, and the manner in 
which they were carried out was appalling. The gigantic number of executions involved 
in this Aktion is far greater than any similar measure undertaken in the Soviet Union up 
to now. Altogether about 150,000 to 200,000 Jews may have been executed in this 
section of the Ukraine belonging to the RK [Reichskommissariat].110 
 
On September 24, 1941, after this wholesale slaughter of ‘useful Jews’, Generalfeldmarshall 
von Rundstedt, High Command Army Group South, issued a stern reprimand to 
Wehrmacht personnel involved in the slaughter, significantly changing their rules of 
engagement within the Ukraine:  
 
[The] struggle against tendencies and elements hostile to the Reich (Communists, Jews, 
etc.), insofar as they are not a part of a hostile military force is, in the occupied areas [in 
the Ukraine], exclusively the task of the Sonderkommando (Special Unit) of the 
[Einsatzgruppen] and the SD [....] Individual actions by members of the Wehrmacht or 
participation by members of the Wehrmacht in excesses by the Ukrainian population 
against the Jews is forbidden; they are also forbidden to watch or take photographs of 
measures taken by the Sonderkommando.111  
 
This clearly showed that, at least in the Ukraine in late 1941, the Wehrmacht had exceeded its remit 
as executioners of convenience. In order to rein in Wehrmacht troops, a change to the rules of 
engagement had to be made in the Ukraine. By explicitly naming the Einsatzgruppen and the SD as 
the only units now to deal with Jews and Communists elements (when not acting as partisans), it is 
made clear that prior to this point the Wehrmacht had been operating under doctrines that allowed 
them the same freedom to eliminate Jews as these specialised killing units. This had directly 
resulted in the unintended slaughter of up to 200,000 Jews, regretted by staff not due to the 
human losses, but because they could have been of short-term use to the Wehrmacht’s war effort. 
By September 1941 in the Ukraine at least, the Wehrmacht’s involvement in the Holocaust was 
officially overstepping the bounds of even the Nazi’s brutal racial policy.  
 
                                                 
110 Nuremburg Documents PS-3257, Documents on the Holocaust, p. 417. 
111 Generalfeldmarshall von Rundstedt, “The Struggle against Elements Hostile to the Reich” 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/wehrein.html . 
http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20617.pdf . 
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Conclusions 
 
The extent to which German soldiers engaged in atrocities in line with Nazi racial policy 
is clearly more marked than previous historians have thought. Soldiers were not ‘willing 
executioners’ brainwashed by National Socialist ideals and conditioned by a unique anti-
Semitism, however they were part of an invasion that was planned from the outset to 
target Jews and Soviet civilians. Official Wehrmacht doctrine for the Ostheer exempted 
soldiers from punishment for killing civilians and Jews, and removed the restrictions of 
the Geneva Convention through several key orders and documents drafted by Hitler and 
top Wehrmacht generals. The rules of engagement in practice on the Eastern Front were 
indiscriminate and brutal; creating an environment that encouraged and enabled 
atrocities. Actual Wehrmacht involvement in the Holocaust is patchily documented, but 
evidence points to more incidents similar to those that have been recovered in archives 
and the structures in place enabling genocide are clear. Therefore, the Wehrmacht was 
more explicitly genocidal in nature than historians and the public have generally believed.  
 
The Ostheer was clearly integrated fully into the Nazi genocidal project in practice 
at the local level, rather than simply herding Jews to the SS or Einsatzgruppen to deal with; 
they were an active player in the killings.  They carried out mass executions and 
annihilated whole villages, as well as assisting the Einsatzgruppen in killing operations and 
conducting death marches. They did this not because they were fanatical anti-Semites, as 
Goldhagen claims, but because they existed within an extremely organised, military 
framework that expected total obedience, and moreover expected them to kill. To kill is a 
normalised expectation for a soldier, but in this case the rules of engagement opened the 
range of legitimate targets far wider than they had ever been before. This framework, 
combined with culture of strict obedience within the Heer, meant that the structures in 
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place around soldiers were extremely strong and most soldiers seemed to lack the will to 
oppose them. That is not to say that there were not fanatical Nazis in both the 
Wehrmacht’s rank and file and officer corps. There most certainly were, just as there were 
also non-Nazis who were anti-Semitic, and otherwise ‘ordinary men’ who tortured and 
killed out of frustration and brutalisation. The Ostheer was a particularly large force, and 
ideology varied from individual to individual.  
 
In general, however, Wehrmacht personnel were not fully integrated into the 
Volksgemeinschaft, and were not fanatical Nazis. Many held to Hitler’s leadership, however, 
and in fighting a war to prevent the spread of Bolshevism and protect the German way 
of life. With the addition of Jewish-Bolshevik and Jewish-Partisan constructs, the 
Commissar Order, and other loose rules of engagement set by the OKW, the conflict 
was presented as a desperate war of ideology and race – a war which Germany had to 
win by any means necessary. The fact that a ‘do-or-die’ situation was evidently the case, 
and not an illusion created by the OKW, drives home the point that whatever their 
personal opinions, Wehrmacht soldiers saw that they had a job to do, and that job was to 
protect the Reich and win the war by any means necessary.  
 
The destruction of Jews, elimination of suspected partisans and supporters of 
partisans, and even the wholesale starvation of large numbers of Slavic civilians were 
couched in terms of absolute military necessity. These orders originated not from 
individual fanatical officers and men on the ground, but came right from the top - from 
the traditionally moderate Wehrmacht High Command, led by Keitel, to Generalobersts, 
issuing additional genocidal rules of engagement to their specific commands, to Leutnants 
commanding troops on the ground. These orders went far further than the terms set out 
in the Wagner-Heydrich agreement - not only were Ostheer units expected to assist 
Einsatzgruppen and SS operations, they were also expected to deal with suspected Jews, 
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partisans and Bolsheviks independently in their area of operations, as executioners of 
convenience. They fulfilled these expectations thoroughly.  
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